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 Foreword 
India’s reserves have been growing since the external reforms of 1991-2 and 1992-3.  
There was a minor interruption after the Asian crises as India borrowed money abroad through 
the mechanism of the Resurgent India Bonds (RIBs), at a relatively high rate of interest.  The 
pace of reserve accumulation has picked up since then with an addition of $25 billion to reserves 
in 2002-3.  
 
Reserve accumulation can be part of a deliberate move to build up reserves as it was in 
1991-92 and in 1992-93 after reserves had sunk to one month of import during the BOP crises.  
Reserves can also be the outcome of exchange rate management of new developments on the 
external sector.  For instance, an unprecedented $ 6 billion of FII inflow came in over a 12 month 
period from October 1993 to September 1994.  This unprecedented inflow was the result of the 
opening of the economy to equity flows coupled with market reforms and represented a stock 
adjustment of the global equity portfolio. Reserves accumulated during this period because of a 
deliberate decision to curb appreciation of the rupee through RBI purchase of excess inflows.  An 
earlier ICRIER paper argued that this was part of an assymmetric exchange rate management 
policy that was more benign towards depreciation of the rupee in response to adverse policy 
developments but restrained appreciation in response to positive shocks such as equity flows 
representing a stock adjustment.  There was also a declared RBI policy since the introduction of 
market related exchange in 1992, that the RBI would intervene to dampen day to day volatility in 
the exchange market. 
   
Empirical literature on currency regimes suggests that from August 1991 to June 1995 
India’s currency regime is best described as a de facto peg to the US dollar, while from then to 
end 2001 it was a de facto crawling peg.  This conclusion is consistent with the objective of 
dampening volatility.  In our view it would also be consistent with the asymmetric exchange 
management hypothesis, if the balance of payments resulted in an excess of capital inflows over 
the current account deficit during the first period and a deficiency during the second.  According 
to this hypothesis the rupee would not be allowed to appreciate in the first situation and reserves 
would accumulate.  In contrast, in the second situation, reserves would be relatively stable while 
the rupee would be allowed to trend downwards (depreciate).  Further research is however 
required to resolve this issue for the 1992-3 to 1996-7 period. 
 
The analysis of the paper is focussed on the period since the Asian crisis.  It argues that a 
clear and well articulated official position on India’s currency regime is not available.  It 
examines the various potential reasons for reserve accumulation emerging from the statements of 
officials and official committees to show that reserve accumulation is the outcome of a currency 
regime whose main objective is to deliver low volatility of the nominal exchange rate. .   
Excessive currency accumulation is seen to be an outcome of this regime.  The paper shows that 
during the past few years the rupee appears to be a de facto peg to the US dollar.  Thus the 
situation seems to have reverted, at least since 2002, to that prevailing between 1992 to 1995. 
 
The paper makes a contribution to the current debate on India’s currency regime and 
reserve policy, issues that have greater significance with the opening of the capital account and 
the new challenges it poses for interest rate policy in India. 
 
Arvind Virmani 
Director & Chief Executive 
ICRIER 







Over the last decade, India engaged in substantial liberalisation
on the current account and the capital account. At the same time, a
fully articulated policy framework deﬁning the currency regime is not
known in the public domain. In this paper, we seek to characterise the
nature of the currency regime, in the period after the Asian crisis. This
is closely linked to better understanding the phenomenon of reserves
accumulation of the recent years. Our results suggest that the main
focus of the currency regime has been to deliver a low volatility of
the nominal exchange rate. The rupee appears to be a de facto peg
to the USD. In the last one year, reserves accumulation cannot be
explained by insurance motivations; it seems to be a passive side eﬀect
of maintaining the currency regime.
∗This paper grew out of conversations with Ajay Shah. The views in this paper are
mine and not of my employers. I am grateful to Arvind Virmani, Shankar Acharya,
the Macrists, Ashok Lahiri, A. Prasad, and Gomez Pineda Javier Guillermo for useful
discussions, to R. K. Pattnaik, CMIE and Indian Quotation Systems for help on data,
and Susan Thomas and Tirthankar Patnaik for help on statistical testing.
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21 Introduction
India has experienced a breathtaking increase in the stock of foreign ex-
change reserves, from a near-zero level in 1991 to $80 billion in May 2003.
In particular, in the period after the Asian crisis, countries all over Asia
have rapidly built up reserves. In this paper, we seek to obtain some in-
sights on the factors shaping this accretion of reserves. This question is
innately closely related to that of characterising the currency regime.
Reserves accretion can occur owing to a desire to hold reserves as ‘insurance’.
It is widely believed that the cost of holding reserves is a necessary ‘insurance
premium’, that should be paid by a developing country that seeks to safely
harness the beneﬁts of globalisation. As an alternative hypothesis, reserves
accretion or depletion can occur as a passive consequence of exchange rate
policy.
We document a variety of metrics of reserves adequacy that have been pro-
posed, in seeking to identify the level of reserves that are desirable in order
to achieve insurance goals. We ﬁnd that by March 2002, these metrics were
substantially satisﬁed. Yet, India went on to add $25 billion in reserves in
the period after March 2002. This suggests that ‘reserves as insurance’ is
not a hypothesis that adequately explains the observed facts.
RBI has not released documents deﬁning the rules through which the cur-
rency regime operates. Hence, we must make inferences based on data in
order to understand the currency regime. Last year, two papers on this
question highlighted the limited exchange rate ﬂexibility of the INR-USD
exchange rate (Calvo & Reinhart 2002, Reinhart & Rogoﬀ 2002). Calvo
& Reinhart observe that currency ﬂexibility in India has not changed since
1979. Reinhart & Rogoﬀ apply a data-driven algorithm for the classiﬁcation
of the de facto currency regime across a large database of countries. They
classify India as a “de facto crawling peg to the US dollar”.
In this paper, we exploit a broad range of empirical strategies, for ob-
taining insights into the nature of the currency regime. These include a
measure of exchange rate ﬂexibility, regression models based on multiple
cross-currency exchange rates, measures of market eﬃciency, and testable
propositions about cross-currency volatility. Our broad ﬁnding is that in
the period following the Asian crisis, the rupee appears to be a de facto peg
to the US dollar.
One competing hypothesis is that policies targeted the reer or the neer.
We argue that if the reer or the neer were targeted, then they should
exhibit low volatility. Instead, we ﬁnd that they exhibit greater volatility
than the nominal INR/USD rate. This suggests that reer targeting was
not the goal of policy.





















In summary, we ﬁnd that India’s policy stance on reserves and the currency
is primarily one of exchange rate management on the INR/USD exchange
rate which seeks to obtain low volatility of rate. Fluctuations of reserves
appear to be a side eﬀect caused by the pursuit of goals of currency policy.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 shows the
familiar empirical facts about India’s experience with reserves accretion,
and summarises the competing hypotheses which could serve as explana-
tions. Section 3 explores the hypothesis that the reserves accretion of recent
years was a consequence of policies focused on reserves adequacy. Section
4 describes the conceptual backdrop of ‘characterising a currency regime’.
Section 5 shows the methodologies that we will exploit in characterising
the currency regime. Section 6 applies these methodologies to Indian data.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 India’s reserves buildup
The build-up of foreign exchange reserves in India has been a major phe-
nomenon in the post-1991 period. Figure 1 shows the familiar time-series,
which shows that reserves rose sharply from $20 billion in 1995 to $75 billion
in 2002 - an increase of roughly 10% of GDP. Starting from near-zero levels
in 1991, India is now the seventh largest holder of international reserves in
the world. Figure 1 highlights the fact that while reserves accretion was
occasionally done using debt inﬂows, for the major part, it was associated
4with stable external debt.
In 2002-03 alone, India added roughly $20 billion to her forex reserves.
This scale of addition to reserves is a unique phenomenon when compared
with India’s historical experience, and invites further exploration (Ranade
& Kapur 2003).
In general, growth in reserves can happen owing to asset management of the
reserves portfolio, or owing to interventions by the central bank.1 Intuitively,
we may expect returns of a few percent in reserves management. If a country
has $100 billion in reserves, then changes in reserves of a few billion dollars
can occur owing to ﬂuctuations in asset prices.
In India’s case, some of the increase in reserves during 2002-03 was the result
of the appreciation of the Euro and the Japanese Yen against the USD.
However, foreign exchange intervention by the RBI was the main cause of
the build up of reserves during 2002-03. According to RBI data, out of
$20.8 billion that were added to reserves during April-December 2002, $3.8
billion were added because of valuation changes, while $13.3 billion represent
capital inﬂows and 3.7 the current account surplus.
There are broadly two competing explanations for a phenomenon of rapid
addition to reserves:
Reserves as a goal of policy It could be the case that India added reserves as a
consequence of reserves policy. That is, India had certain thought out targets
for the minimum required level of ‘reserves as insurance’, and was trying to
rapidly reach this target level.
Reserves as a side eﬀect of currency policy Alternatively, buying and sell-
ing reserves could have been passive side eﬀects of currency policy. Reserves
would go up when RBI intervened to push the price of the INR down, and
vice versa.
Thus, as an alternative to the hypothesis that India has followed a policy
of achieving a desired level of reserves as ‘insurance’, the major competing
explanation is one where RBI has been primarily focused on exchange rate
management, and reserves have ﬂuctuated passively as a response to the
exigencies of RBI’s trading on the currency market. In this paper, we seek
to obtain some insights on the importance of these competing explanations
in understanding India’s post-1991 experience.
This is about disentangling cause and eﬀect. The unambiguous stylised
empirical fact is that reserves grew dramatically, and the INR was weak.
1In addition, reserves can also change owing to repayment of external debt. However,
this has been relatively unimportant in explaining the time-series volatility of reserves in
India.
5We seek to understand whether reserves rose as a consequence of currency
policy, or whether the INR was weak as a consequence of reserves policy.
The key intuition that we employ, in understanding variables which are
targeted, as opposed to variables which are either instruments of policy or
are side eﬀects, is based on interpreting volatility. If reserves were targeted,
then a country would experience ﬁrst reserves volatility in getting to the
target, but then experience low volatility of reserves. Other variables (such
as external debt, exchange rates, money supply and interest rates) would be
volatile in the process of achieving targets for reserves. Conversely, if the
exchange rate were targeted, then other variables (such as reserves, money




If reserves are held as insurance, how large do they need to be? What
is an appropriate ‘target’ for reserves? In the literature on ‘reserves as
insurance’, there are four kinds of measures which have been proposed for
judging reserves adequacy :
Trade based measures Trade based measures focus on the current account. Re-
serves are generally thought to be adequate when they cover six months of
merchandise imports.2
Debt based measures Trade-based measures of reserves adequacy have been
criticised, since they pay no heed to obligations owing to the capital account.
Debt based measures focus on the capital account only, and measure the
ability of reserves to support debt servicing. If access to capital markets is
limited, or if the country depends heavily on short term debt, then such mea-
sures indicate the level of risk in the event of sudden movements in capital,
or changes in the availability of capital.
Liquidity based measures Liquidity based measures focus on the extent to which
reserves can fund all capital account liabilities. In April 1999, Pablo Guidotti,
then the Deputy Finance Minister of Argentina, suggested that emerging
market economies should maintain usable foreign exchange reserves that
cover debt requirements for atleast a year. Projecting a current account
deﬁcit and short term debt provides a measure of new borrowing that may
2Amongst the east Asian countries which experienced a crisis in 1997, reserves went
up from 3 months of imports in 1997 to 8 months of imports cover in 1999 (Hawkins &
Turner 2000).
6be required by a country. Guidotti proposed that reserves should be adequate
to require no new borrowing for a year.
Alan Greenspan extended this ‘Guidotti rule’, suggesting a ’liquidity at risk’
measure that also takes into account a range of possible scenarios for ex-
change rates, commodity prices, credit spreads etc, and takes cognisance of
derivatives such as foreign currency bonds with embedded options.3
This has been dubbed the ’Greenspan rule’, and it suggests that a country
should hold the level of reserves required to ensure no borrowing requirements
over a horizon of one year with a 95% probability.
Money-based measures Money based measures focus on the extent to which a
country has a domestic currency which is backed by foreign exchange. These
measures include ratios such as reserves to broad money, or reserves to base
money, which provide a measure of potential for resident based capital ﬂight
from the currency. To defend a currency peg, the monetary authorities only
need enough resources to buy back the high powered monetary base, equal to
deposits at the central bank plus currency. In practice a central bank would
not need to buy up the entire base to repel any speculative attack (Obstfeld
& Rogoﬀ 1995).
East Asian countries such as China, Taiwan, Korea, Singapore and Hong
Kong are prominent in holding large reserves today. It can be argued that
in the period after the Asian crisis, they felt that the insurance motiva-
tion demanded a higher level of reserves. However, Aizenman & Marion
(2002) ﬁnd that a model explaining ‘demand for reserves’, based on data
for 125 countries from 1980 onwards, under-predicts the reserves holdings of
these nations in the period after the 1997 crisis. An alternative explanation
is that of Calvo & Reinhart (2002), who suggest that a large number of
countries are holding a high level of reserves because they continue to have
extremely limited exchange rate ﬂexibility, even though their exchange rate
is ostensibly ﬂoating.
3.2 Indian experience
In 1991 India had gone down to reserves covering two weeks of imports.
Hence, until 1993-94, there was a strong focus upon reserves adequacy mea-
sured by months of import cover.
The High Level Committee on Balance of Payments, 1993, chaired by Dr. C.
Rangarajan, recommended that the RBI should target a level of reseves that
took into account liabilities that may arise for debt servicing, in addition to
imports of three months.
3This is derived from a speech Currency reserves and debt, by Alan Greenspan, at the
‘World Bank Conference on Recent Trends in Reserves Management’, Washington, D.C.,
1999, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19990429.htm
7Table 1 Reserves adequacy in India
31/3/2001 31/3/2002 31/3/2003
Months of import cover 8.0 11.3 14.0
Short term debt/Reserves (%) 8.6 5.1 4.4
∗
NFA / Currency in circulation (%) 90.4 105.2 125.6
NFA / Reserve Money (%) 65.0 78.0 98.0
Non-debt liabilities + Short term debt / Reserves (%) 100.8 88.4 78.5
#
∗ Pertains to December 2002.
# Pertains to September 2002.
Later the Report of the Committee on Capital Account Convertibility chaired
by S. S. Tarapore (1997), suggested that in order to be able to open up to
capital account convertibility, India should achieve the following targets of
reserves policy :
1. Reserves which give an import cover of atleast six months,
2. Reserves are atleast an import cover of three months, plus 50 per cent of
annual debt service payments, plus 50 per cent of annual debt service pay-
ments, plus one month’s imports and exports to take into account leads and
lags,
3. A ratio of short term debt and stock of portfolio investment related non-debt
liabilities to reserves at not more than 60 per cent, and
4. A net foreign exchange assets to currency ratio (NFA/currency) ratio at
around 70 per cent.
Table 1 shows India’s status on various metrics of reserves adequacy over
the recent three years.
In terms of months of import cover, reserves had reached 11.3 months by
end March 2002. At nearly a year’s imports, these would be considered
suﬃcient. The ratio of short-term debt to reserves fell sharply from 146.5%
in 1991 and 23.2% at end March 1996 to 5.1% at end March 2002. Reserves
were clearly adequate to cover short term debt. The ratio of volatile capital
ﬂows, measured as cumulative portfolio ﬂows and short term debt, which
was 71.1% of reserves at end March 1996 fell to 48.1% of reserves by March
2002. Measuring reserves as cover for non-debt liabilities and short term
debt, by end March 2002, non-debt liabilities and short term debt as a ratio
of reserves fell from 105.2% in 2001 to 88.4% in March 2002, indicating that
reserves were now adequate. In mid-2002, the RBI Governor Jalan indicated
that even if we tested reserves adequacy by the ‘liquidity at risk’ measure,
India had a comfortable level of reserves.4
4This is derived from the speech by Bimal Jalan at a symposium of Central Bank
Governers, hosted by the Bank of England, London, 5 July 2002.




































Net purchase of dollars
In summary, most indicators of reserve adequacy showed that by 31 March
2002, India had ‘adequate’ foreign exchange reserves, when focusing upon
the ‘insurance’ motivation for holding reserves. This raises the question of
how we can explain the last $20 billion accreted into reserves, which took
place in the latest year, i.e. from 1 April 2002 to 31 March 2003. As Figure
2 shows, the net purchase of dollars by RBI in the foreign exchange market
did not slow down over 2000-02.
The extent of debt inﬂows over the 1990s gives us some insight about the
extent to which India was following an active reserves policy. If reserves
of $75 billion had been targeted, then we might have expected a greater
addition to debt to reach that target. However, growth in reserves after
2000-01 were not debt creating (see Table 2).
In a recent article, Kapur & Patel (2003) argue that India’s reserves accre-
tion, which cannot be explained in terms of the metrics of reserves adequacy
as shown above, can be attributed to domestic ﬁscal problems. They argue
that India’s accumulation of reserves is an expression of concern on the part
of policy makers owing to the ﬁscal diﬃculties that India faces.










4 Exchange rate management
4.1 Real versus nominal
We now turn from reserves policy to exchange rate policy. An examination
of long term trends suggests that output markets determine the equilibrium
exchange rate of the rupee in real terms (Patnaik & Pauly 2001). Thus,
the long term trend followed by the rupee in the second half of the 1990s
involved a depreciation of the rupee (in nominal terms) vis-a-vis the US
dollar, in line with the inﬂation diﬀerential between the two countries. This
prevented persistent and sustained deviations, of the bilateral real exchange
rate between the two countries, from purchasing power parity.
It is argued that while in the long run it is the real exchange rate that must
be watched, in the short run, central banks focus on the nominal rate. In
the literature, currency regimes are classiﬁed into ﬁxed, ﬂoating etc. purely
on the basis of the behaviour of the nominal rate. A central bank could be
keeping the long run real eﬀective exchange rate in mind, while on a day to
day basis its currency is a pegged to another currency.
4.2 Understanding a currency regime
There can be three levels of understanding of the regime. The simplest and
most transparent case is one in which the central bank operates on rules
rather than discretion, and publicly releases documents which deﬁne the
currency regime. In this case, the currency regime is transparent and can
be understood by reading these documents.
The ERM, and New Zealand, are prominent examples of publicly disclosed
rules-based interventions by central banks. Going beyond industrialised
countries, Colombia is an interesting example of a developing country which
has developed a completely transparent framework, where central bank in-
10tervention on the currency market is purely driven by publicly disclosed
rules. Colombia’s intervention algorithm is based on a sophisticated under-
standing of modern ﬁnance, and involves selling options through an algo-
rithm that serves to “reduce volatility”, and involves an explicitly stated
reserves policy.
RBI has chosen to not have a transparently disclosed reaction function of
the central bank such as the above. In this case, the next best alternative
is to have high quality disclosure of interventions. The ﬁrst problem with
this path is that of frequency of disclosure. Wickham (2002) notes that
central banks of developing countries are often unwilling to release data
on oﬃcial intervention at a daily frequency, even when it is dated enough
to only be used for research purposes. RBI has chosen similar levels of
non-transparency, so that interventions data in India is only released at a
monthly frequency.
The other problem lies in access for the central bank to other instruments
for trading on the currency market. For example, Ghosh (2002) has con-
structed a dataset about RBI interventions in the currency market, in which
it is believed that on occasion, SBI engages in currency trading at the behest
of RBI. A governance framework which permits the use of such one-removed
methods for introducing orders into the market limits the usefulness of cen-
tral bank intervention data, even when it is disclosed at high frequency.
The third approach is to focus upon the statistical implications that inter-
vention would have for observables, i.e. the statistical characteristics of ex-
change rates themselves. Inferences can be made about the currency regime
by observing the statistical consequences of the regime upon observables.
This is the approach that this paper exploits.
In the literature, one of the most interesting results of this approach is that
the resulting classiﬁcation of the regime often diﬀers from the oﬃcial position
of the central bank. For example, Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2002) ﬁnd that in the
post Bretton Woods period, of central banks claimed that a currency was
a “managed ﬂoat”, 53% were actually de facto pegs or crawling pegs. This
surprising inconsistency reiterates the value of this statistical approach, even
in the presence of assertions by a central bank.
4.3 Oﬃcial position
According to most oﬃcial pronouncements, India sharply moved away from
a ﬁxed exchange rate regime to a “market determined” exchange rate regime
in March 1993. RBI’s oﬃcial position after 1993 is that its exchange rate
policy focuses on “managing volatility” with no ﬁxed exchange rate target,
while allowing underlying demand and supply conditions to determine ex-
11change rate movements in an “orderly” way (RBI 2002). For example, one
statement of the RBI Governor Jalan (1999) is as follows:
The objective of the exchange rate management has been to ensure that
the external value of the Rupee is realistic and credible as evidenced
by a sustainable current account deﬁcit and manageable foreign ex-
change situation. Subject to this predominant objective, the exchange
rate policy is guided by the need to reduce speculative activities, help
maintain an adequate level of reserves, and develop an orderly foreign
exchange market.
These statements are broad enough to permit a wide variety of behaviours
on the part of RBI.
The policy of monitoring of the nominal rate, as opposed to the reer, has
also been oﬃcial RBI policy. As the RBI governor says (Jalan 2002):
From a competitive point of view and also in the medium term perspec-
tive, it is the reer, which should be monitored as it reﬂects changes
in the external value of a currency in relation to its trading partners
in real terms. However, it is no good for monitoring short term and
day-to-day movements as ‘nominal’ rates are the ones which are most
sensitive of capital ﬂows. Thus, in the short run, there is no option
but to monitor the nominal rate.
5 Methodology for characterising currency regime
In this section, we apply empirical strategies which utilise public domain
data, and shed light on the nature of the currency regime that is prevalent.
A currency regime is classiﬁed as a de facto peg to a given currency when
the volatility of the exchange rate against this currency is very low, owing to
policy eﬀorts by the central bank. The phrase ‘market determined exchange
rate’, which is used by RBI and several other central banks, indicates that
that the exchange rate is not administered as in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
The rate is determined in the foreign exchange market in which the central
bank is a major participant. It does not imply that the exchange rate is one
that is determined freely by market forces.
Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2002) test for a de facto peg, which may be in operation
when the authorities have not announced that their currency is pegged.
They approach this in two ways:
1. They examine the monthly absolute percent changes. If the absolute monthly
percent change in the exchange rate is equal to zero for four consecutive
months or more, that episode is classiﬁed (for however long its lasts) as a de
facto peg if there are no dual or multiple exchange rates in place. This allows
12them to identify relatively short-lived de facto pegs as well as those with a
longer duration.
2. They compute the probability that the monthly exchange rate change remains
within a one percent band over a rolling 5-year period. If this probability
is 80 percent or higher, then the regime is classiﬁed as a de facto peg or
crawling peg over the entire 5-year period. If the exchange rate has no drift,
it is classiﬁed as a ﬁxed parity; if a positive drift is present, it is labeled a
crawling peg; and, if the exchange rate also goes through periods of both
appreciation and depreciation it is a moving peg.
The concept of an exchange rate ’peg’ employed in this paper is derived from
the above deﬁnition of a de facto peg. In other words, when a currency is
classiﬁed as a peg to, say, the USD, it is not that its exchange rate to the
USD is ﬁxed, but that the central bank trades on the market to a signiﬁcant
extent to inﬂuence the price.
5.1 Exchange rate ﬂexibility
At the simplest, it is useful to compare Indian currency volatility against
that seen in other countries, in order to obtain a cross-country sense of the
extent of exchange rate ﬂexibility in India.
While a large number of countries have currencies that are oﬃcially “ﬂoat-
ing”, Calvo & Reinhart (2002) ﬁnd that in reality a signiﬁcant number of
them seem to suﬀer from a “Fear of Floating”. They argue that even though
the oﬃcial classiﬁcation of the regime, as reported to the IMF by many a
country, may say that the exchange rate is ﬂoating, countries seem to use a
wide variety of methods to ensure that the exchange rate is not allowed to
ﬂoat. Calvo & Reinhart (2002) propose a metric of exchange rate ﬂexibil-








where σ is the exchange rate volatility, σi is the interest rate volatility,
and σR/p is the volatility of reserves expressed in local currency at constant
prices.5
The interpretation of λ is as follows:
5Alternative metrics of currency ﬂexibility also exist in the literature. For example,






R/M0), which is (in turn) based on Glick & Wihlborg
(1997) and Bayoumi & Eichengreen (1998). This variant does not incorporate the role of
monetary policy and interest rates in achieving currency targets.
13• In countries where exchange rates are targeted, exchange rate volatility will
be low, and the numerator will be small. In order to achieve this, the central
bank will have to incur high volatility in interest rates and reserves (i.e. the
denominator). The extreme value is that of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime,
where λ = σ = 0, where low exchange rate volatility is achieved at a price
of high volatility in reserves and interest rates.
• At the other extreme, with a ﬂoating exchange rate regime, σ will be large,
and the central bank will have stable interest rates and reserves (i.e. a small
denominator), giving high values of λ.
Calvo & Reinhart (2002) compute a single λ for a given time period. In order
to obtain a better understanding of the changes in the currency regime, we
propose to compute λt using rolling windows, with a width of one year. At
each timepoint t, λt is computed using daily or weekly data for the latest
one year. This will allow us to see time-variation in λ.
5.2 Volatility
In order to understand the existing regime, we can explore the falsiﬁable
predictions that ﬂow from a null hypothesis H0 : the INR/USD exchange rate
is the major goal of exchange rate management. If this null were maintained,
we would observe two symptoms:
S1 INR/USD volatility would be much lower than that of INR against other
currencies.
If the INR/USD exchange rate were the focus of exchange rate management,
then the INR/USD volatility would be sharply lower than that seen for other
exchange rates, such as the INR/JPY. These other exchange rates of the
INR would show volatilities that are ‘normal’ with cross-currency pairs seen
internationally under ﬂoating exchange rates.6
It is important to contrast this with the consequences of a reserves policy.
If reserves were the focus of policy, and India started out with highly inad-
equate reserves, then the ‘normal’ volatility of the INR/USD in a ﬂoating
exchange rate regime could ﬁrst be ampliﬁed by having a large trader (RBI)
on the market steadily buying USD. An active reserves policy would give a
6While industrialised countries substantially achieved capital account convertibility
by the late 1950s, attempts to inﬂuence exchange rates continued till the early 1990s.
However, central banks in industrialised countries came to increasingly eschew currency
interventions owing to (a) the desire for an independent monetary policy and (b) the
increasing ineﬀectiveness of intervention given the improvements in liquidity of ﬁnancial
markets. For example, in April 1999, Japan expended $20 billion of reserves and obtained
only a minute impact upon the JPY-USD exchange rate. The last time the US has engaged
in currency intervention was in 1995.
Hence, in the recent period, data for industrial country currency pairs can be assumed
to be purely the outcome of speculative market processes.
14more volatile INR/USD exchange rate. Once a reserves target was attained,
trading by RBI would cease; the INR/USD would go back to being a market
determined exchange rate, and would then exhibit a normal cross-currency
volatility.
S2 The volatility of INR against other currencies would assume values of the
kind seen with other cross-currency volatilities in the world.
If the INR/USD exchange rate were the focus of exchange rate management,
then other exchange rates which are unmanaged, such as the INR/JPY, would
exhibit volatility that is of the same order of magnitude as that is typical with
cross-currency volatilities in the world. In the extreme, if the INR/USD were
a ﬁxed exchange rate, then the INR/JPY volatility would be exactly equal
to USD/JPY volatility.
5.3 Multi currency model
Frankel & Wei (1994) developed a regression based approach for testing for
pegging. In this approach, an independent currency, such as the Swiss Franc






















This regression picks up the extent to which the INR/CHF rate ﬂuctuates
in response to ﬂuctuations in the USD/CHF rate. If there is pegging to the
USD, then ﬂuctuations in the JPY and DEM will be irrelevant, and we will
observe β3 = β4 = 0 while β2 = 1. If there is no pegging, then all the three
betas will be diﬀerent from 0. The R2 of this regression is also of interest;
values near 1 would suggest reduced exchange rate ﬂexibility.
In order to obtain a better time-series sense of changes in the currency
regime, we propose to estimate this regression using rolling windows. This
would give us a time-series of β2t and R2
t, which would give us special insights
into the changes in the underlying currency regime through time.
5.4 Measures of market eﬃciency
The random walk plays a central role in ﬁnancial economics. In an eﬃcient
market, it should not be possible to make speculative proﬁts; that is, it
should not be possible to make forecasts about future returns. For this, the
price process has to be martingale.
7There can be other choices for the numeraire also, such as the GBP. India has smaller
trade and capital account interactions with Switzerland. Hence, we favour CHF as our
numeraire.
15If the INR/USD exchange rate were managed, it would exhibit various
symptoms of market ineﬃciency, such as violations of the random walk.
In contrast, other exchange rates, such as the INR/JPY, would not display
comparable violations of the random walk in a regime where the INR/USD
exchange rate was the focus of currency policy.
Wickham (2002) uses daily currency data to compare the empirical features
of ﬂoating exchange rates of industrialised countries against the “ﬂexible”
exchange rates claimed by developing countries. This is based on an intuitive
argument, that the deviations from the random walk for currency pairs like
the USD/JPY or the USD/EUR serve as normative benchmarks for the
extent to which a true ﬂoating exchange rate deviates from the idealised
random walk.
We propose to use the variance ratio (VR) statistic (Cochrane 1988, Kim
et al. 1991) in order to test for deviations from the random walk. The idea of
the variance ratio test is as follows. If a price series pt follows a random walk,
then the returns series rt exhibits T−scaling in variance. Two-day variance
is twice of one-day variance, and so on. Suppose the data reveals σ2
k and σ2
1
as the variances of k−day returns and one day returns, respectively. Then
we deﬁne the variance ratio VR(k) = σ2
k/(kσ2
1). Under the null of market
eﬃciency, we expect VR(k) to be 1. When the observed VR is signiﬁcantly
away from 1, we reject the null.
We favour the variance ratio test since it is known to have better power than
any of the other unit-root and random-walk tests, such as the Box-Pierce
Q-statistic, and the ADF, for many diﬀerent alternatives.
Our testing strategy for variance ratio statistics follows Lo & MacKinlay
(1988), who derived general forms of the VR statistic, for both homoscedas-
tic and heteroscedastic nulls, to get statistics that are heteroscedasticity-
consistent.8
Under the null that the INR/USD exchange rate were managed, while other
exchange rates such as INR/JPY were left to the market, we would observe
the following symptoms: (a) the INR/USD would exhibit violations of mar-
ket eﬃciency while (b) other exchange rates, such as the INR/JPY, would
not.
5.5 Did policy target the REER or NEER?
One possible policy regime, which policy makers over the 1990s may have
adopted, involves an exchange rate policy which targets the neer or the
8We are grateful to Tirthankar Patnaik and Susan Thomas for the use of the software
developed by them for Patnaik & Thomas (2003).
























23 New Zealand 0.86
24 Indonesia 1.05
reer, instead of targeting the nominal INR/USD exchange rate. In order
to target the real exchange rate, the central bank may intervene when the
real exchange rate is particularly high or low. Keeping the real exchange
rate within a band around a mean would reduce the volatility of the real
rate.
Volatility is, once again, a key tool for discriminating between competing
hypothesis. If the reer were the subject of targeting, then it would have a
lower volatility than the nominal rate. Hence, we propose to compare the
volatility of the nominal exchange rate against that of the REER and the
NEER, in order to understand the nature of the regime.
6 Indian evidence
We now set about exploiting the methodologies described above, in order to
characterise the currency regime in India.

















































At the level of simple empirical regularities, Baig (2001) has a table of daily
currency volatility in 24 countries in 2000 (Table 3). In this, India was the
lowest currency volatility other than Malaysia, which had essentially a ﬁxed
exchange rate regime.
Analysing the behaviour of nominal exchange rates, reserves and interest
rates, Calvo & Reinhart (2002) document two striking facts about India’s
regime change:
1. They ﬁnd that the probability of a near non-change in the currency over a
one-month horizon went up, from 84.5% over the period 2/1979 – 11/1993
to a level of 93.4% over the period 3/1993 – 11/1999. This suggests that the
currency was actually less ﬂexible in the “post-reforms” period after 3/1993.
2. Using monthly data, they ﬁnd that the λt metric takes the same low value of
0.03 for India in both the “pre-reforms period” (1979-1993) and the “post-
reforms” period (1993-1999). This is a striking fact which is inconsistent with
the conventional view that India distinctly made a break with ﬁxed exchange
rates in 1992.
One partial explanation of this ﬁnding might be the episode from 15 Novem-
ber 1993 to 3 March 1995, where the exchange rate was ﬁxed at Rs.31.37
per USD. The computation of λ as one scalar over an entire time-period can
mask changes in policies over this period. In addition, the results in Calvo &
Reinhart (2002) stop at 1999, which does not include the important period
of recent reserves accumulation.
18Our approach, using estimation within rolling windows, is an opportunity to
observe time-series variation in λ, and to obtain the most recent evidence,
going beyond 1999. These results are shown in Figure 3. They are not
directly comparable to those obtained by Calvo & Reinhart, owing to our
use of weekly data as opposed to their monthly data. However, we ﬁnd
that in the period after 1999 also, λt has remained at very low levels, which
suggests a continued regime of little exchange rate ﬂexibility. We may also
note that Figure 3 shows an interesting period in 1998 where India appears
to have experimented with greater currency ﬂexibility.
6.2 Evidence from Reinhart & Rogoﬀ, 2002
Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2002) examine a database of the de facto currency
regimes in 156 countries from 1946 onwards. Using such a classiﬁcation
algorithm, they classify India’s exchange rate regime from July 1995 to De-
cember 2001 as a “de facto crawling peg to the US dollar” (see Table 4).
6.3 Volatility
We now take up our testable propositions about the volatility of the INR
vs the USD and other currencies. We focus on the period after 1/1/1999,
where we observe data for the Euro. Over this period, we deal with three
major currencies: the US dollar, the Euro and the Yen.9
Table 5 summarises the evidence for cross-currency volatilities. It shows the
volatility of daily returns on various currency pairs. Between the USD, EUR
and JPY, there are three currency-pairs (USD-EUR, USD-JPY and EUR-
JPY), and the daily σ seen takes values of 0.71, 0.73 and 0.92 respectively.
This gives us an order of magnitude of the currency volatility that is expected
under a ﬂoating exchange rate.
Under our H0, the predicted symptom S1 involves lower volatility for the
INR/USD as compared with that seen between the INR and other currencies.
This does show up in Table 5. The INR/USD has a daily σ of 0.13, while
the INR/EUR has a daily sigma of 0.72 and the INR/JPY has a daily sigma
of 0.73.
The predicted symptom S2 is also borne out by the data. The values seen
for the daily σ of the INR/EUR and the INR/JPY (0.72 and 0.73) are of the
same order of magnitude as those seen with the three cross currency pairs
between the USD, EUR and JPY.
9We use 980 days of daily data from 1/1/1999 to 13/3/2003, drawn from the CMIE
Business Beacon database.
19Table 4 India’s currency regimes, according to Reinhart & Rogoﬀ (2002)
Dates Classiﬁcation Comments
8/1914 - 22/3/1927 Peg to pound sterling Convertibility into sterling was
suspended.
22/3/1927 - 24/9/1931 Peg Gold standard.
24/9/1931 - 3/9/1939 Peg to pound sterling Suspension of gold standard ad-
herence to sterling area.
3/9/1939 - 10/1941 Peg to pound sterling Introduction of capital controls.
11/1941 - 10/1943 Peg to pound sterling ; “freely
falling”
11/1943 - 1/10/1965 Peg to pound sterling
1/10/1965 - 6/6/1966 De facto band around pound
sterling ; parallel market
There were multiple exchange
rates. Band width was ±5%.
6/6/1966 - 23/8/1971 Peg to pound sterling
23/8/1971 - 20/12/1971 Peg to US Dollar
20/12/1971 - 25/9/1975 Peg to pound sterling
25/9/1975 - 2/1979 De facto crawling band around
pound sterling
Band width was ±2%. Oﬃcially
pegged to a basket of currencies.
3/1979 - 7/1979 Managed ﬂoat.
8/1979 - 7/1989 De facto crawling band around
US dollar
Band width was ±2%. Oﬃcially
pegged to a basket of currencies.
8/1989 - 7/1991 De facto crawling peg to US dol-
lar
8/1991 - 6/1995 De facto peg to US dollar One devaluation in March 1993 –
black market premia rose to 27%
in February.
7/1995 - 12/2001 De facto crawling peg to US dol-
lar
During this period the black
market premium has been con-
sistently in single digits.
Table 5 Daily volatility of cross-currency returns
USD EUR JPY
INR 0.13 0.72 0.73
USD 0.71 0.73
EUR 0.92
20Table 6 Frankel-Wei regression
































In the extreme, if the INR/USD were a ﬁxed exchange rate, the INR/EUR
volatility would be exactly the USD/EUR volatility, and the INR/JPY
volatility would be exactly the USD/JPY volatility. We see something close
to this in Table 5, where the INR/EUR volatility of 0.72 is close to the
USD/EUR volatility of 0.71, and the INR/JPY volatility of 0.73 is close to
the USD/JPY volatility of 0.73.
6.4 Regression based approach
Table 6 shows estimation results for the Frankel & Wei (1994) model, using
data from 13/9/1995 till 5/5/2003. They show that the coeﬃcient of the
USD/CHF rate was 0.966. The null of a pure peg can be rejected, since the
JPY/CHF has a coeﬃcient which is statistically signiﬁcant. However, its
value is only 0.0359. The overall R2 was around 87%. These results indicate
that the rupee was substantially pegged to the USD.
The diﬃculty with these results is that they show the ‘average’ behaviour
over the period 1995-2003, and may mask substantial heterogeneity in the
operation of the currency regime. Hence, we go on to do ‘rolling window’
estimates, where at each time point, data over the latest one year is used
for estimating the regression.
Figure 4 shows the time-series of coeﬃcients thus obtained, and Figure 5






















































































22Table 7 Prob values of the Box-Ljung Q statistic
USD EUR JPY
INR 0.0519 0.3050 0.3358
USD 0.3265 0.1349
EUR 0.2047
shows the time-series of the regression R2. We see that the coeﬃcient of the
USD/CHF was near 1 through the entire period, barring a few periods where
this coeﬃcient slipped slightly (and other coeﬃcients were higher). From
1999 onwards, there appears to be a stable regime where the relationship is
primarily that with the USD. The time-series of the R2 vividly highlights the
brief period with greater currency ﬂexibility, which is also seen in the time-
series of λt, in 1998. After that, the R2 has been mostly near 1, suggesting
that pegging to the USD was the dominant factor in currency policy.
6.5 Market eﬃciency
We now turn to measurement of the extent to which the currency pairs
under estimation exhibit deviations from the random walk.
Table 7 shows prob values for the Box-Ljung portmanteu Q statistic, com-
puted on the ﬁrst 40 lags of the returns time-series. This is a simple measure
of the extent to which the currency series violates the random walk. For the
three cross-currency pairs between the USD, EUR and JPY, we see prob
values of 0.32, 0.13 and 0.20, which suggest that for all the three cross-
currency pairs, we cannot reject the null of a random walk at a 90% level of
signiﬁcance.
Under the null of a managed INR/USD rate, we expected to ﬁnd violations
of the random walk for the INR/USD. We ﬁnd a prob value of 0.0519; the
null of a random walk would be rejected at a 94.2% level.
We argued that if the INR/USD is the subject of exchange rate policy, then
the INR/USD series should suﬀer from rejections of the random walk, but
other exchange rates of the INR should be unblemished. This is borne out
in Table 7, where the Q statistic for the INR/EUR works out to 0.31 and
the Q statistic for the INR/JPY works out to 0.33. The violations of market
eﬃciency are limited to the INR/USD.
Figure 7 shows variance ratios for various lag lengths for three INR exchange
rates, and Figure 6 shows variance ratios for the three currency pairs between
the USD, EUR and JPY. All six graphs here are superposed with critical
values for rejection at a 95% and 99% level of signiﬁcance.


























































































































25Table 8 Spectral tests of white noise for the INR/USD, from Wickham
(2002)
Anderson-Darling Cramer - von Mises Kolmogorov- Kuiper Sample
Statistic Statistic Smirnov Statistic Statistic Size










4-11-97 – 24-8-98 0.2750 0.0463 0.5140 0.7992 210





Note: Values marked with a superscript ‘*’ are rejections at a 95% level.
Figure 6 is useful in illustrating how in a ﬂoating exchange rate regime,
the price is a random walk, and all the variance ratio statistics come out
to be roughly 1 at all lag lengths. This ﬁgure is a striking example of the
eﬀectiveness of speculative markets at producing market eﬃciency.
Figure 7 shows the three currency pairs involving the INR. While the vari-
ance ratios for the INR/USD do not generate rejection at the 95% level
of signiﬁcance, they come close to that, and are strikingly diﬀerent from
the random walk character that is found in all the other variance ratios.
This is consistent with the idea that the INR/USD rate does not enjoy the
informational eﬃciency of a price produced on a speculative market.
Such symptoms are not unique to India. Wickham (2002) ﬁnds that in a
set of 16 developing countries which claim to have ﬂexible exchange rates,
7 exhibit discontinuities / regime shifts. Of the remaining 9, he ﬁnds three
countries where the daily returns process is not white noise, leaving only
six out of sixteen developing countries where the claim of ﬂexible exchange
rates is not denied by empirical tests of white noise.
His evidence on India is consistent with our arguments above, and oﬀers
additional insights. As shown in Table 8, he ﬁnds that for a brief period
from 4 November 1997 to 24 August 1998, the null of white noise cannot be
rejected, but over other periods, it can. These dates are tantalisingly related
to the brief episode with a large value for λt that we ﬁnd in Figure 3. This
may suggest that in late 1997 and early 1998, India brieﬂy experimented
with greater exchange rate ﬂexibility.
6.6 Is the REER or the NEER being targeted?
As argued above, if RBI were targeting the REER, then the REER should
be stable. The evidence seems to deny this. Table 9 compares the volatili-
ties of ﬁve monthly time-series: two neer series, two reer series, and the
nominal INR/USD exchange rate over the period April 1993 to December
2002. The nominal INR/USD exchange rate has the lowest volatility of
26Table 9 Volatilities of monthly percentage changes: 4/1993 to 12/2002
Measure Standard deviation
36-country reer (1985-86 base) 1.7489
36-country neer (1985-86 base) 1.7376
5-country reer (2000-01 base) 1.6722
5-country neer (2000-01 base) 1.5104
INR/USD exchange rate 1.2000














































these alternatives. This suggests that over this period, reer or neer was
not targeted.
This table shows an overall average summary statistic, which could mask
substantial intertemporal variation. For example, while there may have been
strong INR/USD targeting in the period when the exchange rate was ﬁxed
at Rs.31.37/USD (giving a low volatility of the overall INR/USD series), it
may be the case that reer targeting may have played a more important
role in the later period.
Figure 8 addresses this question by calculating the time-series of volatility
in rolling windows, each of which has a width of one year. Hence, the value
for June 1998 (say) pertains to the volatility of the twelve months from July
1997 to June 1998.
This ﬁgure suggests that while the volatility of the nominal exchange rate
has, on occasion, been as high as the volatility of the ﬁve-country reer or
neer, the broad regularity is that the INR/USD was the lowest volatility
series especially after January 1999. This evidence goes all the way to De-
27cember 2002, and hence reﬂects the contemporary currency regime. This
appears to be more consistent with the hypothesis that the currency regime
was focused on the nominal exchange rate. However, these estimates use
rolling window volatilities for one year. They could fail to pick up reer
targetting for over longer time horizons.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we had set out to obtain some insights into India’s experience
with the currency regime, and the accumulation of reserves in recent years.
Did the reserves growth in India, and particularly that observed in the last
one to two years, take place as a consequence of a policy that targeted a
certain minimum level of ‘reserves as insurance’, or did the reserves growth
take place as a passive side eﬀect of maintaining the currency regime?
These questions are inextricably intertwined with the question of character-
ising India’s currency regime. This is related to the puzzle of interpreting
the phrase ‘market determined exchange rate’ that is used by RBI. The
existing currency regime is not based on a transparent set of publicly dis-
closed rules. The oﬃcial stance of the RBI about the nature of the currency
regime should be approached with caution, given the extensive international
evidence that central banks do not do what they say. Hence an analysis of
the data is required in understanding the underlying currency regime.
In this paper, we repeatedly resolve questions about the goals of policy by
focusing upon volatility. In a system where x and y are related variables,
and if x is targeted, then x will experience low volatility and y will expe-
rience enhanced volatility if it is either the instrument used by the policy
maker, or a side eﬀect of policy measures focused on x. This approach al-
lows us to disentangle the true goals of policy from the ‘side eﬀects’ and
instrumentalities of attaining these goals.
We compare India’s reserves holdings against a variety of metrics that have
been proposed in the literature. It appears that by March 2002, India had
adequate reserves going by all these metrics. In this case, the addition of
$20 billion after this point does not support the proposition that the RBI
was motivated by reserves as insurance.
The currency market betrays strong symptoms of a highly managed INR/USD
exchange rate, as has been pointed out by two prominent papers in 2002
(Reinhart & Rogoﬀ 2002, Calvo & Reinhart 2002). We argue that if a null
hypothesis “the INR/USD is the central focus of exchange rate manage-
ment” is maintained, this leads to predictions which are substantiated by
the evidence. The regression framework of Frankel & Wei (1994) is also
consistent with the hypothesis of a nominal peg to the USD. This suggests
28that India has primarily had a nominal exchange rate policy in recent years,
and that reserves accretion has been the side eﬀect of this policy. We ae also
able to reject the hypothesis that in the over a one year horizon the RBI
targets the reer.
It appears that the phrase ‘market determined exchange rate’ should be
usefully interpreted as saying that the exchange rate is shaped on a market,
and not administratively determined, as was the case in preceding decades.
However, it should not be interpreted as meaning that the exchange rate is
determined out of the equilibrium obtained from a large mass of economic
agents on the currency market. RBI appears to be an active trader on the
market, using the large size of its transactions to manipulate the market
price.
As the literature suggests, India has been in a homogeneous regime of low
exchange rate ﬂexibility from 1979 onwards. In the older period, the highly
repressed external sector may have made it easier to achieve goals of cur-
rency policy without repercussions for the domestic economy. However, the
steady liberalisation of the external sector implies that other elements of pol-
icy, particularly reserves and monetary policy, now have to undergo greater
stress in order to achieve traditional goals of exchange rate policy.
The arguments of this paper are useful in understanding Indian macroeco-
nomics and macro policy today. The loss of monetary policy independence
that accompanies an open capital account and a ﬂexible exchange rate cre-
ate new policy dilemmas. When exchange rate adjustment is muted, other
variables in the economy have to adjust in response to shocks. Moreover,
currency regimes with exchange rate targeting are vulnerable to speculative
attacks. The failures of market eﬃciency that this paper documents suggests
that there are opportunities for proﬁtable speculative trading strategies. The
monetary impact of the current exchange rate regime and questions about
speculative activity are topics for further research.
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